RECENT CASES
Bills and Notes-Joint and Several Obligation-[lllinois].-A promissory note was,
by its terms, joint and several. The second paragraph of the note provided" ...
the
makers and all endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment ....
and
....
authority is hereby irrevocably given to any attorney of any court of record
....
[to] confess judgment against the undersigned .... " The note was signed by
two persons and judgment was confessed against one of the two signers. Held, the
warrant of attorney, like the note itself, was several as well as joint, and judgment was
properly confessed against one of the two signers. Farmer'sExchange Bank of Elvaston
v. Sollars, 353 Il. 224, 187 N.E. 289 (1033).
The power to confess a judgment must be clearly given and strictly pursued, and if
power is given to confess judgment against the promisors jointly, a confession of judgment against one severally will render the confession and judgment on it void. Keen
v. Bump, 286 M. 1i, 121 N.E. 251 (1918), W1ells v. DurstChevrolet Co., 341 Ill. 1O8, 173
N.E. 92 (193-). Apparently the Illinois statute requiring that "all joint obligations and
covenants shall be taken and held to be joint and several obligations and covenants"
does not apply to confessions of judgment. Ill. Cahill's Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 76, § 3;
see Keen v. Bump, 286 Ill. 1i, 121 N.E. 251 (1918). That a note is in terms joint and
several will not authorize a several judgment against one of the makers on a joint confession of judgment clause. Mayer v. Pick, 192 Ill. 561, 61 N.E. 416 (ioil).
In Mayer v. Pick, 192 Ill. 561, 61 N.E. 416 (igol) the confession of judgment was
held joint where the language of the confession was "we authorize," even though the
note was joint and several. The court distinguished the present case from the Mayer
case because of the use of the words "the undersigned" (which might refer to each
signer) in the confession clause, and of the word "severally" in the preceding waiver of
presentment clause.
TELFOID F. HOLLMAN

Certiorari-Scope of Review-Revocation of Medical License-[llinois].-Proceedings were instituted under the Medical Practice Act, Ill. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat.
(1933), c. 91, § 16a(3), to revoke the defendant's license to practice medicine, charging
him with gross malpractice, resulting in the permanent injury of a patient. Certiorari
to review an order of the Medical Committee revoking defendant's license was quashed,
and defendant appealed. Held, reversed and remanded, on the ground that the committee in making its order had adopted an erroneous rule of law. Schireson v. Walsh,
354 IMl. 40, 187 N.E. 921 (1933).
Briefs filed in the case reveal that the record brought up contained findings by a
committee of physicians that the patient was diagnosed for bow legs by means of a
photograph, despite the fact that the only proper method of diagnosis was by X-ray or
fluoroscope; that even the photograph did not reveal a case of bow legs; yet the'defendant performed an unnecessary operation, which eventually necessitated the amputation of both legs. In finding the defendant guilty as charged, the committee applied
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the rule that when a physician proclaims himself as a skillful plastic surgeon, a much
higher degree of skill and ability is demanded of him than of the average physician.
The Supreme Court, in reversing the judgment and order of the committee on certiorari, held that an erroneous standard of skill had been applied and that where an
order of an administrative bodyis based upon an incorrect rule of law, such order must
be set aside, regardless of the evidence introduced.
The problem of the scope of the review on certiorariis fairly presented by this decision, since an appeal from a judgment on certiorari can be no more extensive in its
review than certiorariitself. Minaker v. Adams, 55 Cal. App. 374, 203 Pac. 8o6 (1921).
The scope of the writ of certiorarihas been restricted or enlarged either by judicial definition or statute. See 24 Mich. L. Rev. 844 (1926); 36 Yale L. Jour. 1017 (1927);
Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property (1927), 240-242. Some
courts adhere to the conservative notion that on certiorariinquiry will be made only
into defects and errors which concern the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal. Tin v.
United States DistrictCourt, 148 Cal. 773, 84 Pac. 152 (19o6); Minaker v. Adams, 55 Cal.

App. 374, 203 Pac. 8o6 (1921); Mays v. DistrictCourt, 40 Ida. 798, 237 Pac. 700 (1925).
But the meaning of the concept "jurisdiction" is elusive; it has been held that where
the finding has no support in the testimony, there was no jurisdiction to make it. InternationalHarvester Co. v. Industrial Commission, 157 Wis. 167, 147 N.W. 53 (1914).

Many jurisdictions hold that the office of certiorariis also to review questions of irregularity in the proceedings, i.e., whether the tribunal proceeded according to the
legal forms prescribed by statute or common law. Ex parte Big Four Coal Mining Co.,
213 Ala. 305, 104 So. 764 (1925); First Nat'l Bank v. Gibbs, 78 Fla. 118, 82 So. 618
(1919); People v. Lindblom, 182 Ill. 241, 55 N.E. 358 (1899); Barry v. District Court,
167 Iowa 306, 149 N.W. 449 (1914); State ex rel. Matrangav.Judgeof Crimn. DistrictCt.,
42 La. 3089, 8 So. 277 (I89o); Garnseyv. County Court, 33 Ore. 201, 54 Pac. 539 (1898).
See also Doran v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 78 Colo. 153, 24o Pac. 335 (1925),
where, under the writ, the court may inquire into "abuse of discretion."
A more liberal treatment of the writ has made certiorariconcurrent with appeal or
writ of error, to bring up all errors of law, i.e., where the evidence is such that it will not
justify the findings as a legitimate inference from the facts proved; where the action of
the tribunal is based upon an erroneous application of the law to the findings; and
where evidence is improperly admitted or excluded. Harwell v. Marshall, 125 Ga. 451,
54 S.E. 93 (igo6); Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. iii (i86o); Mayor of Medford v. Judge of
Court, 249 Mass. 465, 144 N.E. 397 (1924); People ex rel. Cook v. Board of Police, 39
N.Y. 5o6 (1868); Dryden v. Swinburne, 20 W.Va. 89 (1882).

The broadest application of the writ was effected under the New York Civil Practice
Act (6th ed. 1931), § 304, permitting a review of the weight or preponderance of the
evidence in all certiorariproceedings; and under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation
Act, Ill. Smith-Hurd Rev. Stat. (1933), c. 48, § x5b, f, providing for inquiry into all
questions of law and fact presented by the record in such proceedings. Otis Elevator
Co. v. Industria Commission, 302 Ill. 90, 134 N.E. 19 (1922). The principal case holds
that certiorarimay properly review an erroneous application of the law to the findings.
Inasmuch as the proceedings here were prescribed by the Medical Practice Act which
directs certiorarias the proper remedy but does not purport to define its scope, the common law writ apparently was intended. Yet a long line of Illinois decisions have established that the ruling of the lower court upon the law and the application of the law to
the facts in the rendition of a judgment cannot be reviewed on common law certiorari,
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whose restricted province is an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court, and the legal
form of the court's proceedings. Hamilton v. Harwood, 113 Ill. 154 (1885); People v.
Lindblom, 182 Ill. 241, 55 N.E. 358 (1899); White v. Wagar, 185 Ill. 195, 57 N.E. 26
(I9oo); Joyce v. Chicago, 216 Il. 466, 75 N.E. 184 (195o); Carroll v. Hottston, 341 Ill.
531, 173 N.E. 657 (193o); Crocker v. Abel, 348 111. 269, 18o N.E. 852 (1932); Ellfeldt v.
Chicago, 189 II. App. 61o (1914); People ex rel. Aeberly v. Chicago, 240 InI. App. 208
(1926).

Even conceding that the court felt the need for a more efficacious writ, the order of
the Medical Committee might well have been affirmed. The record contained specific
findings of facts made by a group of medical practitioners. If these facts were sufficient
to justify the finding of gross malpractice by applying the lowest conceivable standard
to the medical profession, then the conclusion should have been upheld and the application of the erroneous standard considered as harmless error. Though an improper
finding of law may be made, if the findings of fact are in accordance with the proper
construction of the law, then the specific finding of law which is erroneous is mere surplusage.
WALTER W. BAKER

Conflict of Laws-Extraterritorial Effect of Custody Decree-[Mvfinnesota].-The
plaintiff and defendant were divorced in Iowa, the court awarding custody of an infant
child alternately to each parent for six months of the year, and providing, for a readjudication of the question of custody in three years. The plaintiff later became domiciled in Minnesota. At the end of one of the six-month periods, plaintiff surrendered
custody of the child to the defendant; but before defendant could return to Iowa, the
plaintiff sued out a writ of habeas corpus challenging his right to the child's custody.
The lower court awarded custody of the child to the plaintiff until further order, and
the defendant appealed, principally on the ground that the Minnesota court lacked
jurisdiction to make a decree affecting the child's custody. Held, the child was domiciled in Minnesota and the MIinnesota court had jurisdiction to determine the child's
custody, not being bound by the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution
to give effect to the Iowa decree. State ex rel. Larson v. Larson, 252 N.W. 329 (Minn.
1934).

Since a decree of custody of a child is an adjudication of a domestic status and alters
substantially the relationship of parent and child, only the state of the child's domicile
should have jurisdiction to award such a decree. People ex rel. Wagner v. Torrence. 27
P. (2d) 1038 (Colo. 1933); Brandon v. Brandon, 154 Ga. 661, i15 S.E. i15 (1922);
W~eber v. Redding, 200 Ind. 448, x63 N.E. 269 (1928); It re Volk, 254 lich. 25, 235
N.W. 854 (i93i); Sanders v. Sanders, 224 Mo. App. 1107, 14 S.W. (2d) 458 (193i); It
re Erving, xo 9 N.J. Eq. 294, 157 AUt. 16x (193'); Griffin v. Griffit, 95 Ore. 78, 187 Pac.
598 (1920); Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1st ed. 1927), § 13i; Beale, The Status of The
Child and the Conflict of Laws, i Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 13, 21 (1933); Beale, The Progress

of the Law, 34 Harv. L. Rev. 5o, 57 (1920); Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce
Suits, 7 Corn. L. Quar. i (1921). Cf. Minick v. Minick, i49 So. 483 (Fla. 1933).
If a court decreeing custody of a child to one parent has adequate jurisdiction, the
preponderance of authority holds that the decree is resjudicataas to all matters prior
to the time of its rendition, and the right of the parent to custody of the child will be
recognized in another state. Wakefield v. Ives, 35 Ia. 238 (1872); State ex rel. Nipp v.

